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ABSTRACT
We examine the incentive effects of transfer programs using a unique policy episode. Prior to 1989,
social assistance recipients without children in Quebec who were under age 30 received benefits 60
percent lower than recipients older than 30. We use this sharp discontinuity in policy to estimate the
effects of social assistance on various labour market outcomes and on living arrangements using a
regression discontinuity approach. We find strong evidence that more generous social assistance
benefits reduce employment, and more suggestive evidence that they affect marital status and living
arrangements. The regression discontinuity estimates exhibit little sensitivity to the degree of
flexibility in the specification, and perform very well when we control for unobserved heterogeneity
using a first difference specification. Finally, we show that commonly used difference-in-difference
estimators may perform poorly when control groups are inappropriately chosen.
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1. Introduction 
 
Links are often drawn between labour market behaviour and the generosity and structure 
of the transfers paid to those not working.  For example, the impetus for many of the 
changes  to  welfare  programs  in  the  United  States  since  1967  was  a  concern  about 
disincentives to work embedded in the programs.
1  In Europe, the ‘eurosklerosis’ problem 
of persistent high unemployment compares unfavourably to the experience in the United 
States.  Blanchard (2004) contends that the ongoing reform of unemployment insurance 
systems and the introduction of in-work tax credits have improved, but not yet resolved 
the problems  affecting European  labour  markets.  Thus, the strength of the  incentive 
effects  of  transfer  policies  continues  to  be  vital  to  the  design  of  policy  and  to  the 
understanding of labour market behaviour. 
 
In  addition  to  labour  market  implications,  transfer  payments  can  have  broader 
behavioural  influences,  such  as  changing  family  structure  or  living  arrangements.
2  
Living arrangements are crucial to the understanding of the effects of transfers because 
economic  welfare  is  usually  assessed  at  the  household  level.    If  living  arrangements 
depend  on  transfer  payments,  then  policy  may  not  lead  to  the  desired  distributional 
consequences. 
 
In our paper, we study the effects of an unusual policy in the province of Quebec that 
paid much lower social assistance benefits to individuals without children who had not 
yet attained the age of 30.  Fortin et al. (2004) used this policy experiment to estimate the 
incentive  effects  of  social  assistance  using  a  difference-in-differences  approach.    The 
break in the policy at age 30 also provides, however, the opportunity to implement a 
regression discontinuity analysis of the impact of welfare payments on labour market 
behaviour and living arrangements. This research design holds out the possibility of more 
                                                 
1 See Moffitt (2003) for a history of welfare programs in the United States.  The 1967 reform adjusted tax-
back rates because of a concern for labour market incentives. 
2 This literature on family structure is reviewed in Moffitt (1998).  Bitler et al. (2003) provide a detailed 
literature review of research on living arrangements.   2 
credible inferences about the incentive effects of welfare policies, for reasons we make 
clear below. 
 
A very large body of research has studied the labour market incentive effects of transfer 
programs.    Moffitt  (2002)  provides  a  recent  survey  of  the  empirical  evidence  in  the 
United States, which followed the exhaustive survey of the earlier literature in Moffitt 
(1992).    He  concludes  that  the  range  of  estimates  suggests  that  the  counterfactual 
elimination of welfare would increase hours worked by 10 to 50 percent.  Several recent 
papers have examined the effects of welfare on living arrangements.
3  However, because 
single non-parents can receive welfare in Canada, the most relevant research for our work 
is the study of the living arrangement of youth in the United States and Canada found in 
Card and Lemieux (2000).  They find that one response of young people to economic 
distress is to continue (or go back to) living with their parents. 
 
The research strategies chosen over the years to study the effects of welfare have been 
closely intertwined with the changing policy environment.  In the 1970s and 1980s, most 
research consisted of the econometric modeling of social experiments, such as negative 
income  tax  schemes,  along  with  non-experimental  econometric  evaluations  of  the 
incentive effects of welfare.  Through the 1980s and early 1990s, the ‘1115  Waiver’ 
programs generated a second wave of studies, as reviewed in Harvey et al. (2000).  With 
a waiver, states could opt out of certain provisions of the Social Security Act in order to 
implement  demonstration  programs  or  experiments  that  altered  the  parameters  and 
structure of welfare programs.  The study of these reforms commonly took the form of 
experimental evaluations, often with treatment and control groups.  Finally, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 generated 
a  further  wave  of  research  attempting  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  reforms  in  the  new 
decentralized policy environment.  Much of the more recent work therefore follows a 
                                                 
3 Hu (2001), Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2003), and Paxson and Waldfogel (2003) look at the living 
arrangements of the children of welfare recipients.   London (2000), in contrast, examines the arrangements 
of welfare-receiving mothers.     
   3 
non-experimental  methodology,  comparing  policy  outcomes  across  states  that  made 
different policy choices in the PRWORA era. 
 
Blank (2002) discusses three challenges confronting researchers studying the reforms of 
the 1990s.   First, the economic environment  improved dramatically  contemporaneous 
with  the  reforms.    Evaluating  a  welfare  reform  in  the  context  of  an  improving 
macroeconomy makes it difficult to isolate the effect of the reform from the shifts in 
labour  demand.    Second,  the  dimensionality  of  the  changes  makes  it  difficult  to 
understand the effect of changing one policy, ceteris paribus.  Reforms were bundled 
together with some mix of time limits, benefit reduction rates, training, and sanctions, 
among other policies.  Finally, the expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit also 
improved the labour market conditions for welfare-at-risk families. 
 
The  age-based  policy  we  exploit  is  able  to  overcome  some  of  the  challenges  in  the 
existing literature.  The source of the advantage is that we do not study a reform per se, 
but a discontinuity present in a static policy.  This means that there is no bundle of other 
reforms that may contaminate the evaluation of the low benefit policy.  Moreover, we do 
not need to make assumptions about the comparability of the treated group to a control 
group located in a labour market that is temporally or geographically distinct.  This helps 
us to avoid worries about a changing broad economic environment.  Finally, the variation 
provided by the policy is large – an increase of 145 percent for those reaching age 30.  
Variation of this magnitude helps to estimate behavioural effects with better precision. 
 
A  further  advantage  was  provided  by  a  reform  that  ended  the  low  benefit  policy  in 
August of 1989.  By comparing behaviour before and after the change, and in Quebec 
versus other provinces of Canada, we can also evaluate the policy using a difference-in-
differences empirical framework commonly used in the welfare reform literature.  This 
allows  us  to  assess  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  commonly  used  empirical 
framework. 
   4 
One innovative feature of our analysis is that we focus on the effects of social assistance 
benefits on the labour market behaviour of men without children.  We think that for this 
group, the decision to work or to collect social assistance can be reasonably modelled 
using a standard labour supply approach.  By contrast, employment decisions of single 
mothers, who are the traditional focus of the U.S. welfare, are complicated by several 
factors like endogenous fertility decisions and the fixed costs of working in presence of 
young children.   
 
After providing some institutional details about welfare in Quebec, we describe our data 
and develop our empirical strategy based on the regression discontinuity approach.  We 
then present a descriptive analysis of that data to provide preliminary evidence on the 
effects of the policy.  Next, we present our regression discontinuity estimates, exploring 
the sensitivity of the estimates to several robustness and falsification tests.  Finally, we 
compare the regression discontinuity estimates to difference-in-differences results and 
conclude. 
 
2. Social assistance in Quebec and Canada 
 
Social assistance (as welfare is called in Canada) programs were funded from 1967 to 
1996 through the Canada Assistance Plan, which offered a 100 percent matching grant 
from the federal government for provincial spending.
4  In contrast to the federally funded 
welfare programs in the United States during that period, the design of the programs was 
left almost entirely to the sub-national regions, subject to weak conditions on eligibility.
5 
A distinguishing feature from the case of the United States is the eligibility of singles and 
non-parents.   
 
                                                 
4 Following 1996, a block grant called the Canadian Health and Social Transfer replaced the Canada 
Assistance Plan.   
5  Provinces had to cover all ‘persons in need.’  They could not set eligibility based on province of 
residence and could only consider the budgetary needs of the person or family, effectively ruling out work 
requirements.  They also agreed to submit statistics to the federal government and set up an appeals 
process.  This discussion is drawn from Baker, Payne, and Smart (1999).   5 
Research on social assistance in Canada has been quite limited.  Dooley (1999) describes 
the trends in social assistance receipt across demographic groups and time.  Dooley et al. 
(2000) find no relationship between female headship and social assistance benefit levels, 
which is not surprising because benefits are still paid if one does not have children or is 
married.  A large-scale social experiment, the Self-Sufficiency Project, was conducted in 
the 1990s and paid  an earnings supplement to social assistance recipients who  found 
work.  The results of the Self-Sufficiency Project are summarized in Ford et al. (2003).  
Finally,  Barrett  and  Cragg  (1998)  and  Green  and  Warburton  (2004)  both  use 
administrative  data  to  study  dynamics  of  social  assistance  participation  in  British 
Columbia. 
 
More closely related to our work, Fortin, Lacroix, and Drolet (2004) study the effect of 
social  assistance  benefits  on  the  durations  of  spells  using  administrative  data.    As 
identifying variation, they use the end of the “under age 30” social assistance rate in 
Quebec in 1989, comparing recipients over and under age 30 before and after the reform.  
Our work differs from theirs in a number of ways.  First, we study static participation and 
living  arrangements  rather  than  dynamics.    Second,  using  survey  data  rather  than 
administrative data allows us to look at a broader range of variables and to use residents 
of other provinces as an additional control group.  Finally, we focus our research design 
closely  on  the  discontinuity  of  benefits  at  age  30,  rather  than  making  broader 
comparisons of those under and over age 30.  If important unobservable characteristics 
are  correlated  with  age,  then  studying  behaviour  at  the  discontinuity  can  improve 
inferences.   
 
2.1  Benefits in Quebec 
 
Social assistance payments in Quebec during the first part of the period we study were 
governed by the 1969 Loi sur l’aide sociale (Social Aid Act).  Benefits were paid “. . . on 
the basis of the deficit that exists between the needs of, and the income available to, a 
family or individual . . .”  Benefits were set periodically by regulation and were kept 
roughly  constant  in  real  terms.    The  number  of  children  and  adults  in  the  family   6 
determined the size of the benefits in a non-linear way, consistent with economies of 
scale within a family.  The regulations also provided for a small income exemption or 
“disregard” ($65 in the 1980s), after which benefits were reduced dollar for dollar with 
income. 
 
The unique feature of social assistance for our purposes is the differential benefit rate by 
age.  Those over age 30 received $507 per month in 1989 (current dollars) compared to 
$185 for those under age 30; a difference of 63 percent.
6  Only cash benefits differed by 
age, so items such as subsidized dental care or medical expenses were the same for those 
over  and  under  age  30.    Recipients  had  to  complete  a  form  every  month,  allowing 
officials an opportunity to determine if age 30 had been attained.  A new Act Respecting 
Income Security received Royal Assent in December 1988 and took effect on August 1
st, 
1989.  The new Act contained a number of changes, including the end of the differential 
rate  at  age  30.
7    We  graph  the  benefit  rates  in  constant  1990  dollars  for  a  single 
employable person without children in Figure 1, for someone over and under age 30.
8 
 
The structure of benefits before 1989 is represented diagrammatically in Figure 2 in a 
static labour supply framework.  A thirty year old faces the budget constraint ABCDE, 
which traces out the social assistance benefit (AB), the earnings exemption (BC), the 100 
percent tax rate on earnings (CD), and finally earnings after social assistance has been 
exhausted (DE).  A 29 year old would face a budget constraint described by AFGHE, 
because of the lower benefit level.  A 29 year old with the preferences over consumption 
and leisure indicated by the indifference curves would choose to work and consume at 
point X.  However, the same preferences for a thirty year old would result in a decision to 
                                                 
6  Under section 18 of the Act, discrimination on the basis of “race, colour, sex, religion, language, national 
extraction, social origin, morals, or political conviction” is not allowed.  Age is not mentioned. 
7 The new Law introduced different rates for those participating in training programs.  Since fewer than 10 
percent of recipients participated in these programs (Fortin, Lacroix, and Drolet 2004), we focus on the 
benefits applicable to those who are available for work but do not participate in the training programs.  
Benefits fell slightly in real terms after the reform for everyone, but no other changes differentially affected 
those over and under age 30. 
8 We constructed these series using the benefit rates and indexation methods described in the legislation (as 
reported in the Revised Statutes of Quebec and the corresponding regulations).   7 
work and consume at point C. The higher benefit levels therefore yield an unambiguous 
prediction of lower labour supply. 
 
3.  Data description and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Most  of  our  analysis  relies  on  data  from  the  1986  and  1991  Censuses.    We  also 
complement  our  Census  numbers  with  some  time-series  data  from  the  Labour  Force 
Survey (LFS).  For both data sets, however, the selection criteria share common features.  
We  focus  our  analysis  on  individuals  without  a  high  school  diploma  (high  school 
dropouts)  who  are  most  ‘at  risk’  for  being  on  social  assistance.
9    We  also  focus  on 
respondents without children, as parents of children were not subject to the lower social 
assistance benefits.
10  The bonus that would be received for bearing a child for those 
under 30 would be large, but we uncovered no evidence of a fertility response to the 
policy in the data.
11  We discuss these sample selection issues in more detail later.  
 
Finally, the present paper looks at males only.  The analysis for females is complicated by 
a series of factors.  First, around age 30, a substantially larger fraction of women than 
men have children and are not, therefore, subject to the differential benefits.
12  Second, 
female  high  school  dropouts  are  much  less  likely  to  be  employed  than  men.    The 
employment rate of thirty year old women and male high school dropouts in Quebec in 
1986 are 39.5 and 70.4 percent, respectively.  For these two reasons, the ‘at risk’ group is 
                                                 
9 Recent data from the Institut de la Statistique du Quebec (2004) indicates that 63 percent of all social 
assistance claimants are high school dropouts.  Our own tabulations based on the 1986-89 Survey of 
Consumer Finance indicates that among childless men age 26 to 35 (the key group affected around the age 
discontinuity in the program), high school dropouts received 59.7 of social assistance payments, even 
though they only represented 23.5 percent of the population. 
10 We classified people as “childless” or “without children” when they either do not have children, or have 
children but do not live with them.    
11 The analysis of fertility in the context of Quebec in this era is also complicated by the Allowance for 
Newborn Children which paid bonuses of up to $8,000 for a new child.  Milligan (2003) finds little 
evidence of a fertility response among low education and low income women. 
12 Among 30 years old high school dropouts in Quebec in 1986, 75.7 percent of women had (and lived 
with) children, compared to 53.4 percent for men.  Two reasons explain this difference.  First, women are 
much more likely than men to be single parents.  Second, women have their children at a younger age than 
men.   8 
much  smaller  for  women  than  men.    Finally,  we  are  more  concerned  about  possible 
fertility responses in the case of women than men.   
 
4.1  Census Master Files 
 
The bulk of our analysis is based on the master files of the Canadian Census.  Statistics 
Canada conducts the Canadian Census quinquennially in years ending with a ‘1’ or a ‘6’, 
in contrast to the decennial nature of the Census in the United States.  The coverage of 
the  Census  is  universal.    A  detailed  questionnaire  (long  form)  is  assigned  to 
approximately twenty per cent of households, consisting of questions on labour market 
characteristics  and  participation,  education,  income,  and  the  demographics  of 
respondents.  Some of the labour market participation questions are asked with reference 
to the week previous to Census day, while others refer to the previous calendar year.  
Because  we  can  observe  single  years  of  age  in  the  Census,  we  can  implement  our 
regression discontinuity empirical strategy with these data. 
 
Statistics Canada typically releases a public use microdata file of between 2 and 3 per 
cent of respondents.  As we are interested in obtaining large samples of individuals in 
narrowly defined cells, we obtained access to the full twenty per cent  master sample 
maintained by Statistics Canada.  With this sample, we can form cells of sufficient size 
for meaningful analysis.  For example, Appendix Table 1 shows that we have over 10,000 
observations for each year of age in Quebec in the 1986 Census.  Since between 26 and 
32 percent of these men have not completed high school (column 2), we get samples of 
around  3,000  high  school  dropouts  for  each  age  group  (column  3).    The  last  set  of 
columns in Appendix Table 1 shows that the samples are further reduced when we only 
keep men without children.  We still have, however, over 1,500 observations for each age 
group around the discontinuity at age 30.   
 
The  Census  allows  us  to  create  a  host  of  interesting  variables  for  analysis.  For  the 
reference week prior to census day, we observe whether the respondent was employed, 
and  the  hours  worked.    We  can  also  observe  whether  the  relationship  between  the   9 
respondent and the head of the household.  When the head is a parent or a parent-in-law 
to the respondent, we code him as living with his parents.  For marital status, we code the 
respondent as married if he is legally married or in a common-law relationship. 
 
Other variables like income by source are measured over the previous calendar year.  In 
particular, the Census collects separate income items for earnings, unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefits, old age security, CPP/QPP, family allowances, and child tax 
credits.  Unfortunately, the Census does not collect a separate income item for social 
assistance benefits.  These benefits are included in a remaining “other transfers” variable 
that also includes workers compensation payments, some payments under training 
programs, and small provincial tax credits claimed on the tax return.
13   
 
Fortunately, social assistance benefits are by far the largest component of the “other 
transfers” variable.  This is illustrated in Appendix Table 2 that compares the 1986 
Census to a pooled sample of the 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF).  The SCF is a much smaller survey which is, otherwise, quite similar to 
the Census (Boudarbat et al., 2003).  Unlike the Census, however, the SCF collects a 
separate income item for social assistance payments.  Appendix Table 2 shows that social 
assistance accounts for over 85 percent of “other transfers” (“SA+other” in the table) for 
the age and demographic groups relevant to our study.  As a result, one cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that all the difference in “other transfers” between men just under and just 
over thirty is due to differences in social assistance benefits.  For the remainder of the 
paper, we will thus assume that all of the discontinuity in “other transfers” at age thirty is 
due to the discontinuity in social assistance benefits at age thirty.  For all practical 
purpose, this means that we can use “other transfers” and “social assistance benefits” 
interchangeably in what follows.   
 
4.2  The Labour Force Survey 
 
                                                 
13 Few other items included in the “other transfer” category are either negligible or do not apply for the age 
group under consideration (e.g. veterans’ pensions).  
   10 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a monthly national household survey with questions 
about  the  labour  market  behaviour  and  demographic  characteristics  of  household 
members, comparable to the monthly Current Population Survey in the United States.  
The  sample  size  is  approximately  100,000  individuals  per  month,  with  households 
staying in the sample for overlapping six month rotations.  The population coverage of 
the LFS excludes residents of the territories, persons living on Indian Reserves, full-time 
members of the military, and inmates of penal institutions.  A comparable set of surveys 
is available from 1976 to the present.  Small provinces are oversampled, necessitating the 
use of survey weights to calculate representative statistics. 
 
The primary disadvantage of the LFS for our purposes is sample size.  The number of 
Quebecers in the appropriate age range who are high school dropouts is small in any 
month’s sample – typically about 100 males and 50 females are between the ages of 25 
and 29.  In addition, we do not observe single years of age.  Instead, age is reported in 5-
year age groups.  For these two reasons, the regression discontinuity approach cannot be 
successfully implemented with the LFS. 
 
We instead exploit the frequency and long availability of the LFS to document the long-
term trends  in the  labour market behaviour of our target population, comparing them 
across age groups and provinces.  Figure 3 graphs the employment rate for males.  We 
use a three-year moving average to smooth the employment rate series that otherwise 
show erratic movements because of small sample sizes.  The top two lines trace the rate 
for 25-29 year olds and 30-34 year olds in provinces other than Quebec (“rest of Canada” 
hereafter).  The two lines follow the rough contours of the business cycle, rising in the 
1980s and falling with the recession of the early 1990s.  Two observations are relevant.  
First, the cyclicality of the employment rates makes obvious the need to have a control 
group in order to separate business cycle effects from policy effects.  Second, the lines for 
the two age groups track each other quite closely.  This suggests that  labour  market 
conditions for these two age groups are comparable. 
   11 
The  second  set  of  lines  shows  the  employment  rate  by  age  groups  for  residents  of 
Quebec.  The lines both lie approximately 10 percentage points below those for the rest 
of Canada, suggesting that any search for policy effects ought to consider differing labour 
market conditions across regions of the country.  The age groups do not track each other 
as  closely  in  Quebec  as  was  the  case  for  the  rest  of  Canada.    In  particular,  the 
employment rate of 25-29 years old is substantially larger than the employment rate of 
30-34 years old prior to 1990.  From 1990 on, however, the employment rates of the two 
age groups are much more comparable.  This is consistent with the view that low social 
assistance benefits for men under 30 prior to August 1989 lead to a substantial labour 
supply response.   
 
Other factors could nonetheless account for the abnormally large employment rate of 25-
29 years old in Quebec in the late 1980s.  Perhaps the strong economic recovery of the 
second half of the 1980s disproportionally benefited younger workers in Quebec.  It is 
also not clear why the employment rates of 25-29 and 30-34 years old were quite similar 
in the early 1980s, despite the fact that Social assistance benefits for those under 30 were 
already  much  lower  back  then.    For  all  these  reasons,  we  now  turn  to  a  regression 
discontinuity approach.  We later return to a more detailed discussion of how standard 
difference-in-differences  estimates  (like  those  implicit  in  Figure  3)  compare  to  the 
regression discontinuity results.   
 
4.   Empirical Approach 
 
Our main empirical approach exploits the discontinuity in social assistance benefits at age 
30.  Consider the regression model: 
 
(1)  , ) ( 1 0 ia ia ia a TREAT Y e d b b + + + =  
   12 
where Yia is an outcome variable for individual i of age a.  The effect of age on the 
outcome variable is captured by the function 
￿
(a), while TREATia is a treatment dummy 














The evaluation problem consists of estimating the effect 
￿ 1 of the treatment (higher social 
assistance  benefits)  on  the  outcome  variable.    The  key  identification  assumption  that 
underlies the regression discontinuity (RD) strategy is that 
￿
(.) is a smooth (continuous) 
function.
14  Under this assumption, the treatment effect 
￿ 1 is obtained by estimating the 
discontinuity  in  the  empirical  regression  function  at  the  point  where  the  treatment 
variable switches from 0 to 1 (age 30 in our case).  We have a “sharp” RD design since 
the treatment variable is a deterministic function of the regression variable (age).   
 
The assumption that 
￿
(.) is a continuous function means that differential benefits are the 
only  source  of  discontinuity  in  outcomes  around  age  30.    How  reasonable  is  this 
assumption?  As  is  well  known,  most  of  our  variables  of  interest  like  income, 
employment, and family arrangements exhibit well-know age profiles.  For instance, log 
earnings are a concave function of age, which is consistent with a standard model of 
investment in human capital (Mincer 1974, Murphy and Welch, 1990).  So while it is 
important  to  let 
￿
(.)  be  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  non-linearities  in  the  age 
profiles, there is no reason (in human capital or related theories of behaviour over the 
life-cycle) to expect an abrupt change at age 30. 
 
There are, nonetheless, at least two reasons why the assumption 
￿
(.) is a continuous at age 
30 may be violated.  First, while the true age of an individual is predetermined, it is 
conceivable that some people could find ways to “cheat” on their age by, for example, 
falsifying their birth certificates.  If such manipulations were possible, people claiming to 
                                                 
14 See Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) and Lee (2003) for a more formal discussion of the 
conditions under which the RD design is as valid as if it were based on a randomized experiment.     13 
be age 30 could be systematically different from those age 29.  In particular, people age 
29  with  a  higher  propensity  to  receive  social  assistance  (because  of  low  earnings 
capacity,  etc.)  could  systematically  claim  they  are  30,  thus  generating  a  spurious 
correlation between age and the error term.  This problem is unlikely to occur here since 
the true age of an individual can be easily verified by social assistance authorities.
15   
 
A potentially more serious problem is that we only select individuals with dependent 
children for most of our analysis, since only those individuals are subject to differential 
social assistance  benefits.  As shown  in  Appendix Table 1, the  fraction of  men with 
children increases steeply as a function of age.  To the extent that these fertility and living 
arrangements decisions (live with your children or not) are endogenous, this generates a 
problem of non-random selection in our main analysis sample.  For instance, we explain 
in Section 6 that the steep decline in employment rates as a function of age most likely 
reflects the fact that men without children are an increasingly “negatively selected” group 
of individuals.  As long as these selection biases are a smooth function of age, however, 
they will be captured by the function 
￿
(.) and the RD approach will remain valid.   
 
The RD approach may not be valid, however, if the decision to have children and live 
with  them  was  itself  influenced  by  social  assistance  benefits.    For  instance,  an 
unemployed man living with his wife and children could decide to leave home once he 
turns 30 because he can now get much higher social assistance benefits as a “single”.  
Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Figure 1 show, however, that there is no evidence of a 
discontinuity at age 30 in the fraction of men with children in Quebec in 1986.  In fact, 
the increase in this fraction between age 29 and 30 is essentially identical to what is 
observed in situations where there is no discontinuity in social assistance benefits at age 
30 (Quebec in 1991, Rest of Canada in 1986 or 1991).  We also present some additional 
results below where we estimate our models for all men instead of conditioning on men 
without children.  Using all men “solves” the selection problem but leads (presumably) to 
                                                 
15 Note that it was relatively easy to falsify one’s age in Quebec in the 1980s since baptismal certificates 
issued by local parishes were used as official birth certificates (and proof of identity).  By the time 
individuals were in their late 20s, however, their “official” birth date had long been recorded by tax, social 
insurance, citizenship (passport) and other government authorities.  It is thus highly unlikely that more than 
a handful of individuals managed to get higher social assistance benefits by cheating on their age.     14 
a smaller estimated treatment effect since we now add a group of individuals known to be 
unaffected by the differential benefits (men with children) to the main analysis sample of 
men without children.   
 
In practice, the estimated treatment effect depends on how the smooth function 
￿
(.) is 
itself estimated.  One possible route is to estimate 
￿
(.) using non-parametric methods, 
with the usual trade-offs in the choice of the bandwidth.  When a very small bandwidth is 
used, the estimate of 
￿ 1 ends up being the difference in the mean value of the outcome 
variable just to the right and just to the left of the discontinuity point.  But unless very 
large amounts of data are available, such estimates may be very imprecise.  With a larger 
bandwidth,  however, a  bias  can  be  introduced  if people  further away  from the exact 
discontinuity point are systematically different from those at the discontinuity point.   
 
We  balance  this  trade-off  between  precision  and  bias  by  estimating  a  variety  of 
polynomial  specifications  for  the  regression  function 
￿
(.).    In  Section  6,  we  present 
estimates  of  the  treatment  effect  using  five  different  specifications  for  the  regression 
function.  The specifications include standard linear, quadratic, and cubic functions, as 
well  as  linear  and  quadratic  splines  (separate  regressions  on  both  sides  of  the 
discontinuity).   
 
We also need to adapt our RD approach to some of the data limitations discussed in the 
previous section.  One problem is that we only know the age in years of the individual at 
census day (typically the first week of June).  This means that the best we can do is to 
compare all individuals age 29 on census day to all individuals age 30 at census day.  In 
other words, we cannot compare people who “just turned 30” to people “just about to turn 
30”.   
 
Because of this data limitation, all the information available in the micro data can be 
summarized  in  the  age-specific  means  of  the  variables  (sufficient  statistics).    The 
empirical model we work with is the age-cell version of equation (1): 
   15 
(2)  . ) ( 1 0 a a a a TREAT Y e d b b + + + =  
 
Regression  estimates  of  equation  (1)  based  on  micro  data  are  identical  to  weighted 
estimates of equation (2) when the weight used is the number of observations by age 
group. 
 
Another advantage of working with age cells is that is straightforward to test how well 
the model “fits” the data.  Since the outcome variable Ya is a cell mean, its sampling 
variance Va  can be readily computed.  Under the assumption that model (2) is correct, the 
only source of error in the model should be the sampling error.  This assumption can be 
tested using the goodness-of-fit statistic 
 
￿ =
a a a V GOF ) ˆ (
2 e . 
 
Under the null hypothesis that model (2) is well specified, GOF should follow a chi-
square distribution with N-k degrees of freedom.   
 
Up to now, we have implicitly assumed that the outcome variable Y was measured at the 
time of the Census.  As discussed in the previous section, some of the outcome variables 
like current employment and hours of work, marital status, and family arrangements are 
indeed measured at the time of the census.  However, other variables like transfer income, 
earnings,  and  weeks  worked  pertain  to  the  previous  year.    As  a  consequence,  the 
regression discontinuity is not “sharp” for these outcome variables. 
 
To see this, consider the receipt of social assistance transfers in the previous year.  Take 
the case of an individual age 30 at census day who turned 30 on the first of December in 
the previous year.  This individual was thus “exposed” to higher social assistance benefits 
for only one of the twelve months during the previous year.  We deal with this problem 
by assigning 1/12 to the treatment variable for this specific individual.   
   16 
If we knew the exact birth date of individuals, we could use the fraction of the previous 
year during which the individual was age 30 as the treatment variable.  The treatment 
variable TREATia would be equal to zero for all individuals age 29 or less at census day, 
one for all individuals age 32 or more at census day, and a number ranging from zero to 
one for those age 30 or 31 at census day (depending on their exact birth date).   
 
Since we only know the age in years at census day, we need to average TREATia over all 
individual of a certain age.  We do so by assuming that Census day is June 1
st and that 
birth dates are uniformly distributed over the year.  Under those assumptions, it is easy to 
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By contrast, in the models for outcomes at the time of the Census, TREATa is simply 0 for 
all individuals age 29 or less at census day, and 1 for individuals age 30 or more.   
 
One concern is that some of the advantages of the RD design are lost because we do not 
have a sharp discontinuity for the outcomes variables measured over the previous year.  
Fortunately,  it  is possible to test for the  impact of this shortcoming when  looking at 
employment.  In the Census, we know both the employment status in the reference week, 
and the number of weeks worked in the previous year.  For a given age group, we can 
construct an employment rate in the Census reference week, ERCa, and an employment 
rate based on the fraction of weeks worked in the previous year, ERLa.   
 
                                                 
16 The values of the treatment variable TREAT’a for age 30 and 31 are obtained by integrating over the 
uniform distribution of birth dates.  It can be shown that for age 30 we get TREAT’a  = .5(7/12)
2 = 0.170.  
For age 30 we get TREAT’a  =  1-.5(5/12)
2 = 0.913.     17 
We  can  thus  compare  the  “sharp”  RD  results  based  on  the  analysis  of  the  outcome 
variable ERCa, to the “fuzzy” RD estimates based on the variable ERLa.  We find that 
both  specifications  give  very  similar  results  (Section  6),  which  suggests  that the  RD 
approach yields valid estimated treatment effects despite the “fuzziness” introduced in 
outcome variables measured over the previous year.  More specifically, the model for the 
employment rate on census week is 
 
(4a)  , ) ( 1 0 a a a a TREAT ERC e d b b + + + =  
 
while the model of the employment rate in the previous year is  
 
(4b)  ' ) ( ' ' ' ' 1 0 a a a a TREAT ERL e d b b + + + = . 
 
We can then compare the alternative estimates of the treatment effect 
￿ 1 and 
￿ ’1.  The two 
estimates should be the same if the models are well specified.  If the labour supply impact 
of social assistance benefits is large, the employment rate at census week (equation 4a) 
should drop sharply between age 29 and 30, as TREATa jumps from 0 to 1.  By contrast, 
most of the drop should occur between age 30 and 31 in the model for the employment 
rate  in  the  previous  year  (equation  4b)  since,  according  to  equation  (3),  TREAT’a 
increases from 0.170 at age 30 to 0.913 at age 31.   
 
This suggests another estimator of the treatment effect based on the difference between 
the two employment rates, which is in fact the change in the employment rate between 
the previous year and the Census reference week.  If individuals truly reduce their labour 
supply once social assistance benefits become more generous, the employment rate of 30 
years old (on census week) should be unusually low compared to their employment rate 
in the previous year (when they were mostly 29).   
 
This alternative estimator is essentially a first-difference (FD) estimator that exploits the 
longitudinal  nature  of  the  information  about  employment  in  the  census.    Under  the   18 
assumption that 
￿ 1 = 
￿ ’1 , this FD-RD estimator is obtained by estimating the regression 
model  
 
(5) ) ' ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ' ( 1 0 0 a a a a a a a TREAT TREAT ERL ERC e e q b b b - + + - + - = - , 
 
by (weighted) OLS.  Note that 




’(a), is once again a 
smooth function of age that can be captured by the same functions as before.  As in a 
standard FD model, one advantage of this model is that individual-specific fixed effects 
are eliminated by taking differences in the error term in equation (5).   
 
The RD estimator is based on the assumption that people close to the discontinuity are 
similar.    While  the  assumption  is  highly  plausible  in  our  case,  it  usually  remains 
untestable at some basic level.  Perhaps people just above 30 are different from those age 
29  for  some  unmodelled  reason.    The  FD-RD  estimator  goes  one  step  further  by 
comparing the employment of the same individuals at age 29 and 30.   
 
Taken together, the quasi panel nature of the Census (for employment behaviour) and the 
discontinuity  in  social  assistance  benefits  at  age  30  provide  a  variety  of  estimation 
strategies that can be used to validate our basic RD research design.  In Section 6, we 
present these alternative estimators and argue that the RD estimates of the  impact of 
social  assistance  benefits  on  employment  are  indeed  very  robust  across  estimation 
methods.  This gives considerable confidence in the RD estimates for other outcomes of 
interest.  
 
5.  Cross-sectional age profiles  
 
Before  turning  to  the  RD  estimates,  we  first  graph  a  host  of  outcomes  against  age, 
looking separately at Quebec and the rest of Canada over the 1986 and 1991 censuses.  In 
principle,  all  we  need  in  our  RD  design  are  the  data  from  Quebec  in  1986.    It  is   19 
nonetheless  useful  to  see  whether  the  raw  data confirm  the  basic  prediction  that  age 
profiles are discontinuous around age 30 in Quebec, but not in the other cases.   
 
Figure 4 presents employment rates (reference week) by age, from 20 to 39.  Like all 
other figures discussed in this section, Figure 4 is based on the sample of male high 
school dropouts with no dependent children.  Separate lines are drawn for Quebec and the 
rest of Canada, and for the 1986 and 1991 Censuses.  A vertical line marks the split 
between those under and over age 30.  The top two lines are for the rest of Canada.  After 
rising 9.6 percentage point to 70.5 percent at age 23 for 1986, the employment rates are 
generally flat with a slight downward trend.  The smaller sample size in Quebec adds 
more sampling variation to the Quebec lines, but a striking change in the relative position 
of the 1986 and 1991 lines is evident at age 30.  The drop at age 30 in 1986 is 5.2 
percentage points.  After age 30, both Quebec lines trend downward. 
 
A very similar pattern can be seen for hours worked in the reference week in Figure 5.  
Between ages 23 and 29, hours worked in Quebec in 1986 is constant at around 26 hours 
per week.  At age 30, there is a dramatic drop to 24 hours per week, a decrease of 7.2 per 
cent.  Together, these two figures suggest that most of the variation in labour market 
participation for this sample of males is on the extensive margin. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 explore two measures of living arrangements.  The four lines tracing out 
the proportion of respondents living with their parents in Figure 7 are virtually on top of 
each other across all ages.  The rate falls from around 70 percent at age 20 to around 20 
percent at age 39.  Clearly, the sharp discontinuity in social assistance benefits at age 30 
in Quebec in 1986 appears to have little impact on this dimension of living arrangements.   
 
The proportion of respondents who are legally married or in a common-law partnership is 
graphed in Figure 7.  After age 30, the four lines are close to each other and constant just 
under a rate of 30 percent.  However, before age 30 the line for Quebec in 1986 shows an 
increasing  gap,  reaching  4.3  percentage  points  relative  to  Quebec  in  1991  at  age  29 
before falling to near zero at age 30.  Breaking the data into separate analyses (not shown   20 
here) for legally married and common-law partnerships reveals that much of the pattern is 
driven by legal marriages.  This may indicate that single males were more willing to enter 
into  a  marriage  when  the  social  assistance  rate  was  low  than  when  it  was  high.  
Furthermore, the absolute drop in being married at age 30 may indicate that these social 
assistance-induced marriages did not persist once the male had the possibility of a higher 
government transfer payment at age 30.  Moreover, the age 29-30 jump in the proportion 
of respondents who report being separated or divorced was 2.9 percent in 1986, compared 
to only 1.6 in 1991, providing further suggestive evidence that social assistance had some 
impact on marital choices. 
 
The next set of figures displays results from variables based on income data from the 
calendar year prior to Census day.  As discussed earlier, only those who are age 32 or 
higher on Census day spent the entire previous calendar  year over age 30.   For this 
reason, we draw an extra line in the figures between ages 31 and 32.  The ages between 
the lines correspond to ages at which some time was spent at age 29 and some at age 30 
in the previous year.  
 
The first income graph in Figure 8 shows the dollar value of “other government transfers” 
(in 1990 Canadian dollars).  As discussed earlier, this variable mostly captures social 
assistance benefits.  Before age 30, the 1986 and the 1991 lines for Quebec follow each 
other very closely.  By age 32, a large gap between them opens.  By contrast, social 
assistance receipts only grow slowly as a function of age in the rest of Canada in either 
1986 or 1991.   
 
Figure 9 shows the level of earned and self-employment income.  In both Quebec and the 
rest of Canada, the age-earnings profile grows steeper between 1986 and 1991.  This shift 
is more prominent in Quebec where men age 32 to 39 earn less in 1986 than in 1991, 
while men age 25 to 29 earn more in 1986 than 1991.  A natural explanation for this 
pattern of results is that younger men (age 25-29) in Quebec worked more (Figures 4 and 
5) and earned more in response to the very low social assistance benefits that prevailed in   21 
1986.  Note, however, that there is not a sharp decline in earnings between age 29 and 32 
that mirrors the sharp increase in social assistance receipts documented in Figure 8.   
 
6.  Regression Discontinuity Estimates 
 
We now formally exploit the discontinuity in social assistance benefits by estimating the 
RD models discussed in Section 4.  After several experiments, we decided to limit our 
analysis to men age 25 to 39.  The reason for this choice is that the age profile in most of 
the variables in Figures 4 to 9 is systematically different between age 20 and 24 than 
between age 25 and 29.  This suggests that data for age 20 to 24 are of little use for 
helping to fit the model around the discontinuity point.   
 
Note  also  that  all  the  regression  models  are  estimated  by  (weighted)  OLS  using  the 
inverse  of  the  sampling  variances  (Va)  as  weights.    The  resulting  estimates  are  very 
similar to those obtained using the number of observations in each age cell as weights.  
The advantage of using the inverse of the sampling variances instead is that the sum of 
square residuals is equal to the goodness-of-fit statistic GOF (up to a normalization).   
 
6.1  Employment Effects 
 
Table 1 shows the estimated treatment effects for the labour supply variables in Quebec 
in 1986.  Column 1 shows the RD estimates for the employment rate in the previous year 
(1985).  This model corresponds to equation (4b) in Section 4.  The employment impacts 
are precisely estimated in the first four models, but less precisely estimated when the 
richest model, the quadratic spline, is used.   
 
The results are even stronger in the model for employment at Census week reported in 
column 2.  In this model, the employment effect remains precisely estimated even when 
the quadratic spline is used (the most flexible model).  Remember that we have a sharp 
discontinuity in this latter model, while the discontinuity is not sharp in the model based   22 
on the employment rate in the previous year.  This may explain why the effect of social 
assistance  is  more  precisely  estimated  for  employment  at  census  week  in  the  more 
flexible models like the cubic and the quadratic spline.  
 
One nice feature of the results is that the two employment rate measures yield remarkably 
similar estimates.  This suggests that the RD approach is appropriate for the models of 
previous year outcomes despite some of the data shortcomings discussed in Section 4.  
Note also that the goodness-of-fit tests suggest that even the simpler models (linear or 
linear spline) fit the data very well.   
 
To get a better sense of how the models fit the data, we compare the predicted regression 
models to the actual data for the two employment measures in Figures 10 and 11 for the 
linear spline models.  In the case of the employment rate in the Census reference week, 
we place the discontinuity point at age 29.5.  Since people coded as “age 30” on census 
day are 30.5 years old, on average, we need to move the discontinuity point by half a year 
to get people who are exactly age 30 on census day.  In the case of employment in the 
previous year, we place the discontinuity point at age 30 and 5/12
th for similar reasons.  
In all the “previous year” models, we both show the linear regression lines (solid lines 
predicted by the linear splines) and the actual fit obtained using the TREAT’ variable 
(dotted lines).   
 
Both Figures 10 and 11 present strong evidence that employment drops abruptly once 
individuals become eligible for the higher social assistance benefits.  As expected, the 
decline in employment measured at census week happens between age 29 and 30, while 
the decline in employment measured over the previous year (Figure 11) mostly happens 
between age 30 and 31.  Interestingly, the estimated employment effect of the higher 
social assistance benefits is almost identical for the two measures of the employment rate 
in the  linear spline  models  illustrated in Figures 10 and 11.  Table 1 shows that the 
estimated effects are -0.047 and -0.049 for employment last year and in the reference 
week, respectively.   
   23 
As discussed earlier, an even  more  stringent test of the disincentive effects of social 
assistance  on  labour  supply  is  based  on  the  difference  between  the  two  employment 
measures.  The FD-RD estimates of equation (5) are reported in column 3 of Table 1.  
The estimated employment effects are very robust across specifications and tend to be a 
bit smaller than the standard RD estimates reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.   
 
Remember that the key group used to identify the FD-RD estimates are individuals age 
30 at the time of the Census.  Since these individuals were mostly 29 in the previous year, 
we  should  see  their  census  week  employment  drop  relative  to  their  previous  year 
employment as they become exposed to the higher benefits after turning 30.  By contrast, 
all other age groups (except for a few of the 31 year olds) are exposed to the same social 
assistance benefits at census week and in the previous years.  Figure 12 confirms this 
prediction that the employment rate difference is abnormally low for individuals age 30 at 
the  time  of  the  Census.    The  figure  also  shows  that  the  regression  fit  based  on  the 
difference model (solid line) is quite similar to the fit implied by the two models for 
employment levels (dotted line defined as the difference between the regression lines in 
Figures 10 and 11).   
 
The last column of Table 1 shows that the effect of higher social assistance benefits on 
hours of work at census week (including zeros) is similar to the estimated effect on the 
employment  rate.    The  estimated  effect  on  hours  in  the  linear  spline  model  (-.1.72) 
represents about 7.1 percent of average hours of work (24.39).  This is very similar to the 
7.9  percent  effect  on  employment  probability  obtained  for  the  most  comparable 
employment  rate  model  (linear  spline  model  for  employment  at  census  week).    The 
results  suggest  that  all  of  the  impact  of  social  assistance  benefits  on  labour  supply 
happens at the extensive margin (participation) as opposed to intensive margin (hours of 
work conditional on employment), which is consistent the model presented in Figure 2.   
 
We run a series of “falsification experiments” in Table 2 to present further evidence on 
the robustness of our findings.  Since there is no discontinuity in social assistance benefits 
in Quebec in 1991 or in the rest of Canada in either 1986 or 1991, RD estimates for these   24 
alternative  samples  should  not  show  significant  employment  effects.    Table  2  indeed 
indicates a sharp contrast between Quebec in 1986 where employment effects are always 
significant at the 95 percent level (except in one case where it is significant at the 90 
percent  level),  and  other  regions  or  years  where  employment  effects  are  generally 
insignificant.  The contrast is particularly striking for the FD-RD estimates (second panel 
of Table 2) where only one of the fifteen estimates for other regions or years is significant 
(at the 90 percent level).  Interestingly, estimates based on employment at Census week 
(first panel) are more erratic.  They are even statistically significant in a number of cases.   
 
One interesting methodological finding is thus that the availability of panel data (quasi 
panel in the Census) does indeed make the RD estimates more reliable.  This is illustrated 
in  the  last  column  of  Table  2  that  shows  the  difference-in-differences  in  the  RD 
estimates.
17  These difference-in-differences estimates range from -.055 to -.098 for the 
regular RD estimates, but only from -.048 to -.053 for the FD-RD estimates.  Putting all 
these  results  together,  we  conclude  that  higher  social  assistance  benefits  reduce  the 
employment  rate  by  at  least  three  percentage  points,  and  perhaps  as  much  as  five 
percentage points.  Furthermore, the similarity in the results for the different employment 
specifications suggest that the RD approach “works” despite the fuzziness introduced in 
the models based on the reporting of outcomes over the previous calendar year. 
 
6.2  Other outcome variables 
 
Table 3 shows the estimated effects for a variety of other outcomes variables.  The first 
column  reports  the  estimates  for  total  social  assistance  income  based  on  the  “other 
transfers” variable in the Census.  The results indicate a precisely estimated effect in the 
range of $450 to $500 per year for the different specifications.  The second column shows 
that the effect on total transfer dollars comes from both a higher take-up rate of social 
assistance  (column  2),  and  higher  social  assistance  receipts  conditional  on  receiving 
                                                 
17 The rationale for such an estimator is that there may be “spurious” region and year specific discontinuity 
at age 30 that can be removed by taking difference in differences.     25 
positive  transfers.    Both  of  these  effects  are  precisely  estimated  and  robust  across 
specifications.   
 
More importantly, the magnitude of the estimated effects is consistent with other results 
presented in the paper.  For example, we find that the higher social assistance benefits 
increase the take-up rate of social assistance (column 2) by about 4 percentage points.  
This is right in the range of employment effects (3 to 5 percentage points) documented in 
Table 1.  Once again, this is consistent with the labour supply model of Figure 2 that 
predicts all workers who quit employment in response to higher social assistance  benefits 
end up receiving social assistance payments. 
 
The results in column 3 indicate that people on social assistance experience, on average, a 
$1,200 increase in social assistance receipts when they become eligible for the higher 
benefits at age 30.  This is considerably smaller than the roughly $3,300 annual increase 
in benefits that an individual on social assistance for a full year should experience after 
turning 30.
18  As is well known, however, people move in and out of social assistance and 
typically  spend  less  than  a  full  year  on  social  assistance.    There  is  unfortunately  no 
information on the  number of  months an  individual  spent on social  assistance  in the 
Census.  Fortin et al. (2004) show, however, that the median spell of social assistance for 
men  age  25  to  29  lasted  between  6  and  9  months  in  the  1980s  and  early  1990s.  
Furthermore, existing validation studies suggest that social assistance (welfare) receipts 
are  underreported  by  a  factor  of  about  a  third  in  standard  government  surveys.
19  
Correcting the $3,300 figure for underreporting and the fact that people do not typically 




The social assistance results for the linear spline models are illustrated in Figures 13 to 
15.  In all three cases, there is clear visual evidence of a discontinuity around age 30.  
                                                 
18 The difference in monthly benefits in 1985 is about $280 in Figure 1. 
19 See Kapsalis (2001). 
20 Some back-of-the-envelope calculations based on the numbers reported in Fortin et al. (2004) suggest 
that social assistance claimants spend, on average, about 7 months on social assistance during a calendar 
year.  $3,300 multiplied by 7/12 and 2/3 is equal to $1,283, which is very close to the estimated effect.   26 
Note that both the total social assistance money transfers (Figure 13) and the take-up rate 
of social assistance (Figure 14) are trending up as a function of age.  The explanation for 
this upward trend is, once again, that men without children are negatively selected in 
terms of their labour market prospects, and that the magnitude of the bias increases as a 
function  of  age.
21    By  contrast,  the  total  dollar  value  of  social  assistance  benefits 
conditional on receiving some benefits (Figure 15) is roughly a constant function of age 
except  for  the  discontinuity  at  age  30.    This  is  consistent  with  the  administrative 
regulations of social assistance that do not link benefits to age, except for the differential 
benefits for individual under the age of 30.   
 
The last set of columns of Table 3 show the impact of social assistance benefits on a few 
other outcomes.  Column 4 shows that there is a negative but not statistically significant 
effect of higher social assistance benefits on the amount of unemployment insurance (UI) 
benefits.  This suggests, at best, weak substitution effects between social assistance and 
UI.   
 
Column 5 shows that higher social assistance benefits generally a negative impact on 
annual  earnings  (including  zeros).    This  is  consistent  with  expectations  since  earlier 
results  show  significant  impacts  on  employment.    However, the  effect  is  imprecisely 
estimated  and  not  statistically  significant  (except  in  the  quadratic  model  where  it  is 
significant at the 90 percent level).  In fact, the standard errors are too large to make it 
possible to distinguish among some reasonable null hypotheses.  One first hypothesis is 
that workers affected by the higher benefits are representative of all workers.  The means 
in Table 1 and 3 indicate that people earn, on average, about $11 an hour.
22  Given the 
estimated  effect  on  weekly  hours  in  Table  1  (1.72  for  the  linear  spline  model),  the 
expected effect on annual earnings is $11x1.72x52=$980, which is basically the same as 
the estimated coefficient in Table 3 ($975).  By contrast, if workers affected at the margin 
                                                 
21 This interpretation of the evidence is based on the fact that social assistance does not trend up as a 
function of age when all high school dropouts, as opposed to only those without children, are used in the 
analysis. 
22 This is obtained by dividing average earnings ($13,924) by average weekly hours (24.39) times 52 
weeks.     27 
are earning the minimum wage ($4), the expected effect would be $360.  Unfortunately, 
$980 is not statistically different from $360 because of the large standard errors. 
 
Another interesting hypothesis is that workers who drop out of the labour force are the 
ones who previously earned more than the lower “under age 30” benefits, but now earn 
less than the higher “over age 30” benefits and decide to drop out of the labour market.  
The implication of this (Ashenfelter, 1983) model of program participation is that the 
decrease in earnings should be smaller than the increase in social assistance payments of 
about  $500  (column  1  of  Table  3).    Once  again,  this  hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected 
because of the imprecision of the earnings estimates.   
 
The last column of Table 3 shows that, consistent with Figure 7, higher benefits have a 
negative effect on the probability of being married.  One possible explanation is that 
people have incentives to live together and share expenses when forced to live on the low 
social assistance benefits, but then can afford to live alone once they become eligible for 
the higher benefits at age 30.  
 
Finally,  Table  4  shows  the  “falsification  test”  for total  social  assistance  payments  in 
Quebec in 1991 and in the Rest of Canada in 1986 and 1991.  As in the case of the 
employment models reported in Table 2, there is generally no significant discontinuity in 
social assistance payments except in Quebec in 1986.   
 
6.3  Broadening the target group 
 
As discussed in Section 4, one concern with our main estimation results is that we may be 
creating a sample selectivity problem by only looking at men without children.  We are 
not too concerned with this problem since Appendix Figure 1 shows no evidence of a 
discontinuity at age 30 in the fraction of men who have children.  As an additional piece 
of evidence, we show the employment rate (at census week) for all high school dropouts 
in Appendix Figure 2.  The figure shows once again a sharp drop in employment between 
age 29 and 30 in Quebec in 1986, but no comparable change in the other regions or years.    28 
Running  the  linear  spline  model  yields  an  estimated  employment  effect  of  -0.030 
(standard error of 0.008).  As expected, this is smaller than the corresponding effect for 
childless men only (-0.049) since we are now also including men with dependent children 
who are not affected by the differential benefits.  In fact, since about half of the men 
around age 30 have dependent children, the estimate for the broader sample should be 
about half of the estimate for the larger sample, which is consistent with our findings.
23   
 
Appendix  Figure 3 shows the same graphs  for  all  men,  irrespective of their  level of 
education and of the presence of children.  Note that each data point in the figure is now 
based on very large samples of more than 10,000 individual per year of age in Quebec, 
and around 30,000 individuals in the rest of Canada.  Twenty percent of the Canadian 
population at each age is used to compute these employment rates.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
there is still clear evidence of an abrupt decline in the employment rate at age 30 in 
Quebec in 1986.  The point estimate in the linear spline model is about one percentage 
point (-0.012, standard error of 0.06).  This is roughly a third of the estimate for high 
school  dropouts  only  (Appendix  Figure  2).    Once  again,  this  is  consistent  with  our 
expectations since the fraction of high school dropouts receiving some social assistance is 
about three times as large as the corresponding fraction for all individuals (footnote 8). 
 
The robustness of our findings to the choice of sample and estimation method gives us 
considerable  confidence  in  our  findings  that  more  generous  social  assistance  benefits 
have an adverse impact on employment.  While the impact is relatively modest for the 
whole population, we find quite substantial impacts for the group most affected by the 
differential benefits (high school dropouts with no dependent children).   
 
7.  Comparing RD and Difference-in-Differences results 
 
                                                 
23 Accounting for the standard errors, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimate for the broader 
sample, -0.030, is a half of the estimate for the narrower sample, -0.049. 
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In this section, we compare the results  from the regression discontinuity estimator to 
results from more traditional difference-in-difference estimators.  In the PRWORA era, 
many researchers have pursued difference-in-difference strategies to measure the effect 
of welfare reform across states and years.
24  Our goal is to assess the effectiveness of 
these commonly used methods in estimating treatment effects. 
 
The  cancellation  of  the  low  benefit  policy  in  1989  makes  a  pre-  and  post-1989 
comparison natural.  In addition, we can use the other provinces in Canada as a control 
for any common economic shocks hitting the entire country.  We present statistical tests 
featuring comparisons with the two additional control groups, using both cell means and 
regressions to draw inferences.   
 
8.1  Difference-in-difference estimators 
 
We start with the group of Quebecers at age 29 in the 1986 Census.  The first comparison 
we draw looks at Quebecers age 30 in 1986.  This discontinuity cell mean estimator will 
be unbiased if there is no trend in the age profile for the dependent variable.  Reflecting 
on the figures discussed in Section 6, this assumption seems reasonable for several of the 
labour supply variables, but less so for the living arrangements measures. 
 
To account for age effects, three different control group strategies may be pursued.  First, 
comparisons can be made to the age 29 versus age 30 gap in the rest of Canada in 1986.  
If the age profile of the dependent variable is the same in Quebec and the rest of Canada, 
this estimator will be unbiased.  Second, we can use Quebec in 1991 as a control group.  
This control group will produce unbiased if the age profile for the dependent variable is 
unchanged through time.  As 1991 saw the onset of a sharp recession, this assumption 
will not hold if younger labour market participants were differentially affected by the 
recession.  Finally, we can compare Quebecers at age 29 in 1986 to those age 29 in 1991, 
then compare the result to the same difference in the rest of Canada.  To be unbiased, this 
                                                 
24 See the discussion in Blank (2002), or the extensive literature cited in Bitler et al. (2003).   30 
estimator requires the assumption that the 1991 recession had the same impact on the 
behaviour of residents of Quebec as the residents of other provinces. 
 
The  ultimate  cell  mean  estimator  combines  all  the  control  groups  into  one  triple-
difference estimator.  The 1986 difference in the age 29-age 30 gap between Quebec and 
the rest of Canada is compared to the same difference in the 1991 Census.  This estimator 
is  unbiased  so  long  as  the  age  profile  of  the  dependent  variable  does  not  shift 
differentially between 1986 and 1991 in Quebec and the rest of Canada. 
 
The final estimator we present places the triple differences in a regression framework.  
For the sake of consistency with the RD analysis, we define an indicator variable TREAT 
which takes the value 0 for observations at age 29 in Quebec in 1986 (low benefits), and 
1  otherwise  (high  benefits).    We  then  create  an  indicator  variable  for  age  (
￿ a),  an 
indicator for residing in the province of Quebec (
￿ p), and an indicator for observations 
from the 1986 Census (
￿ t).  We include these indicators, along with their second order 
interactions  in  the  regression  equation.    Finally,  we  include  a  vector  of  observable 
characteristics  Xapt  for  each  observation.    The  extra  control  variables  included  are 
dummies for completed years of education, dummies for mother tongue (French, English, 




￿ 1 coefficient is the regression analogue to the cell mean triple difference estimator.  
The  dependent  variables  (Yapt)  are  regressed  on  all  of  the  explanatory  variables  by 
ordinary  least  squares  using  the  following  equation,  with  a  indexing  age,  p  indexing 
province, and t indexing time. 
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8.2  Results from the Census 
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Table 5 reports the results for employment in the reference week and for having positive 
social assistance transfers in the previous year (take-up rate).  At the top, we show the 
mean of each dependent variable for the treatment group, 29 year old Quebecers in 1986.  
The next five rows display cell means for the treatment group, compared to different 
control groups.  Finally, the last row reports the regression coefficients for the triple-
difference regression. 
 
The  first  column  has  the  results  for  being  employed  in  the  reference  week.    The 
discontinuity cell means estimator compares the mean of 29 year olds to 30 year olds.  
The estimated effect is a strongly significant 5.2 percentage points, which is 7.9 per cent 
of the mean.  The next row shows the effect of a difference in differences estimator using 
the age 29 – age 30 difference in the rest of Canada as a control for any age-related trend 
in employment.  The difference between employment for those ages in the rest of Canada 
is a small and insignificant 0.7 percentage points, leading to little change in the estimated 
effect relative to the discontinuity measure. 
 
The next control group is Quebecers from the 1991 Census.  The age gap for employment 
in 1991 was 2.7 percentage points in favour of those age 30, compared to 5.2 percentage 
points in the other direction in 1986.  Looking at the graph for employment in Figure 4 
for the rest of Canada, it appears that the 1991 recession had a differential impact on 
younger males relative to older ones.  To the extent this macro shock influences the age 
29 – age 30 employment gap in Quebec, the resulting difference-in-differences estimator 
may be biased. 
 
Restricting  attention  to  29  year  olds  only  provides  the  next  difference-in-differences 
comparison.  Here, the estimated impact of the policy is an insignificant 1.0 percentage 
points.  Why is this estimate so different than the others?  To be unbiased, the estimator 
requires that the 1991 recession have the same impact on employment in Quebec and in 
the rest of Canada.  Hoynes (2000) and Black et al. (2003) provide evidence that local 
economic conditions influence welfare expenditures.  To the extent that conditions differ   32 
in Quebec and the rest of Canada, using the rest of Canada as a control may be a poor 
choice. 
 
The final cell mean result for employment in Table 6 is the triple-difference estimator.  
The  estimated  effect  of  the  policy  was  a  decrease  in  employment  of  7.9  percentage 
points, or 12.0 percent of the  mean. Directly  beneath  is the corresponding regression 
estimator, which shows a similar negative response of 7.4 percentage points.  Regression 
estimators analogous to the other cell mean estimators also showed little change in the 
estimated  impact  of  the  policy.    Since  the  extra  control  variables  are  unlikely  to  be 
strongly different in the age 29 and age 30 groups, this is unsurprising. 
 
The next set of results in Table 6 uses the presence of transfer income as the dependent 
variable.    The  discontinuity  cell  mean  estimator  suggests  an  effect  of  5.8  percentage 
points.  However, Figure 8 makes clear that transfer receipt trends up with age, so the 
comparison of 29 to 32 year olds may be upward biased.  The next two estimators control 
for the upward age trend using the rest of Canada and Quebecers in 1991 as control 
groups, respectively.  The estimated impact here is lower, at 3.9 percentage points and 4.0 
percentage points.  These estimates are economically large, representing 21 per cent of 
the mean for this variable.   
 
The analysis of difference-in-differences results in this section has shown that additional 
control groups do not necessarily improve on the regression discontinuity estimator.  In 
particular, without a control group placed in the same labour market as the treatment 
group,  the  difference-in-difference  estimates  can  diverge  greatly  from  the  regression 
discontinuity estimates. 
 
8.3  Comparing to the LFS 
 
One difficulty with using Census data for performing a difference in differences analysis 
is the long time lag (five years) between each Census.  Ideally, a difference in differences 
analysis should compare outcomes just before and just after the change in policy.  To do   33 
so, we turn back to the LFS data used in Figure 3.  Table 6 presents cell means and cell 
differences using a window of 36 months on either side of the policy change in August 
1989.
25  We have to use these relatively wide windows because of small sample sizes.  
The first row shows the mean of the dependent variable for residents of Quebec in the 25-
29 age group (low benefits group) in the 36 months before the reform.  The employment 
rate for this group is 61.6 per cent.  We also look at another outcome variable available in 
the LFS, the fraction of people still living with their parents.  The second column of the 
table shows that 42.4 per cent of men in this group live with their parents. 
 
The next three rows of numbers show the results from differencing estimators, comparing 
the cell mean in the treatment group to those in control groups.  Below each difference is 
the standard error.  The top difference estimator compares the two age groups in Quebec 
in the 36 months before and after the reform.  This estimator will produce an unbiased 
estimate if there is no time trend difference in the behaviour of the two age groups over 
this  period.    The  estimated  mean  decrease  in  the  employment  rate  is  5.6  percentage 
points, which is a 9.1 per cent decrease on the mean value.   
 
The  next  differencing  estimator  uses  the  rest  of  Canada  as  a  control  group  for  the 
difference  between  the  age  groups  in  Quebec,  just  looking  at  the  period  before  the 
reform.  This estimator will produce an unbiased estimate if there is no fixed difference in 
the age gap in Quebec versus the rest of Canada. The estimated impact of the policy on 
employment is slightly larger than with the previous estimator, and the estimate for living 
with parents is much larger.  The 9.5 percentage point decrease in living with parents 
corresponds to a 22 percent decrease relative to the mean. 
 
Finally, the last row combines the two control groups using a triple difference estimator.  
The difference between age groups, Quebec and the rest of Canada, and before and after 
the reform is calculated, yielding a decrease of 5.0 per cent for employment and 6.2 per 
                                                 
25 We exclude July and August 1989 from the analysis as the policy was actively changing at that point and 
we want to avoid any adjustment process.  The 36 month band was chosen to gather sufficient sample sizes 
for precise inferences.  Tighter bands around the reform led to similar, but less precise estimates.   34 
cent for living with parents.  Relative to the mean, these are economically significant 
magnitudes. 
 
Which estimator performs best depends on the nature of the unobservable characteristics, 
as the estimators identify the effect of policy only  by  assuming the absence of  fixed 
differences across the control groups.  For example, the difference estimator in the second 
row  assumes  that,  in  the  absence  of  the  policy,  there  would  be  no  difference  in  the 
behaviour  of  respondents  in  the  two  age  groups.    If  the  onset  of  a  recession  had  a 
differential impact on one age group relative to another, this estimator would be biased.   
 
While the employment results are quantitatively similar to the RD estimates reported in 
the previous section, we find a large and significant effect on living arrangements in the 
LFS which is at odds with the RD estimates.  As mentioned earlier, there is clearly no 
abrupt decline between age 29 and 30 in the fraction of men living with their parents in 
Quebec in 1986.  This suggests that the difference in differences estimates from the LFS 
are  driven  by  some  spurious  province-age  specific  shocks  that  are  not  appropriately 
controlled for.   
 
9  Conclusions 
 
Using a unique policy episode involving lower social assistance payments to those under 
30 in Quebec, we studied the effects of a transfer program on several measures of labour 
market  behaviour,  income  and  living  arrangements.    Our  main  finding  is  that  more 
generous social assistance benefits substantially reduce the employment probability of 
less-educated men without dependent children.  The employment rate for this group of 
men drops by three to five percentage points in response to the higher benefits.  Perhaps 
more surprisingly, we also find that higher benefits also reduce the employment rate of 
all men by about one percentage point.  From a broader perspective, this suggests that 
work disincentives embodied in to social programs may explain some (but certainly not 
all) of the difference in employment rates across OECD countries.     35 
 
We also find that, as expected, the take-up of social assistance increases when benefits 
rise.  We do not find significant impacts, however, in the case of most other outcome 
variables.  One exception is marital status.  Higher social assistance benefits appear to 
reduce the probability of being married.  We also find some (imprecise) evidence that 
higher social assistance payments substituted for decreased earnings. 
 
These findings are limited for several reasons.  In particular, all our effects are identified 
for men at age 29-30. This might not generalize to other ages.  Furthermore, our results 
for single employable males may not be relevant for similar programs in countries like 
the United States where this group in not eligible for welfare benefits.   
 
We also have several interesting methodology findings.  Most importantly, we find that 
the RD approach gives sensible results that are not very sensitive to whether we control 
very  flexibly  or  just  with  a  linear  specification.    We  also  find  that  exploiting  the 
longitudinal  nature  of  the  Census  (FD-RD  method)  improve  inferences.    Finally,  we 
conclude  that  difference-in-differences  estimators  are  more  sensitive  to  specification 
issues than the RD estimates.  While the difference-in-differences approach works well 
when we use a control group in the same labour market, it does not work very well when 
we use other regions to control for common economic trends. 
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Appendix Table 1: 
Cell Size and Sample Composition in the 1986 Census, Men 
 
All men in  All HS Dropouts Cell size for High School
Quebec 1986 in Quebec 1986 Dropouts without children
Age Cell size Fraction HS Cell size Fraction Quebec Quebec RoC RoC
Dropouts w/ children 1986 1991 1986 1991
20 10,945 0.274 3,004 0.027 2,923 2,471 10,203 8,553
21 11,939 0.268 3,202 0.046 3,055 2,206 9,890 7,303
22 11,908 0.275 3,272 0.072 3,037 1,933 9,362 6,299
23 11,838 0.279 3,299 0.118 2,909 1,764 8,736 5,990
24 11,701 0.284 3,318 0.169 2,757 1,733 8,118 5,664
25 12,006 0.297 3,564 0.234 2,730 1,833 7,557 5,677
26 11,841 0.307 3,634 0.323 2,461 1,778 6,594 5,719
27 11,594 0.315 3,650 0.381 2,258 1,797 5,770 5,384
28 11,812 0.311 3,672 0.452 2,013 1,758 5,186 5,294
29 11,939 0.310 3,696 0.497 1,859 1,676 4,506 4,939
30 11,593 0.305 3,537 0.534 1,647 1,637 3,912 4,784
31 11,253 0.299 3,364 0.566 1,461 1,579 3,722 4,219
32 11,156 0.289 3,219 0.590 1,319 1,506 3,241 3,959
33 10,549 0.279 2,943 0.614 1,135 1,425 2,872 3,741
34 10,806 0.271 2,930 0.640 1,056 1,367 2,551 3,406
35 10,451 0.268 2,796 0.652 972 1,236 2,499 3,275
36 10,438 0.270 2,823 0.656 970 1,195 2,384 3,036
37 10,331 0.271 2,804 0.682 893 1,150 2,232 2,761
38 10,260 0.283 2,908 0.706 856 1,013 2,371 2,504
39 10,327 0.295 3,046 0.711 881 1,012 2,382 2,477
Note: These descriptive statistics are based on the 20 percent sample of the Canadian 
Census.  The acronym “RoC” stands for the “rest of Canada”. 
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Appendix Table 2: 
Comparison of 1986 Census and 1985-88 SCF 
 
___________________________________________________ 
                                                      
A. 1985-88 Survey of Consumer Finance                                     
 
Age group  Observations   SA+other     SA     other    
_________  ____________   ________   ______   _____ 
 
26-30          313          848        764      84    
                            (98)       (95)    (24)    
  
31-35          212         1263       1072     191  
                           (147)      (131)    (77) 
 
Difference:                -415       -308    -107 
                           (177)      (162)    (80) 
 
 
B. 1986 Census 
 
Age group  Observations   SA+other    
_________  ____________   ________    
 
26-30       10,238          791 
                            (22) 
 
31-35        5,943         1407 
                            (45) 
 
Difference:                 -616 
                            (44) 
___________________________________________________ 
Note: Computed from a sample of male high school 
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Table 1 
Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Higher 
Social Assistance Benefits on Labour Supply in Quebec, 1986 
 
Empl. rate Empl. Rate Difference Weekly
Specification for age last year at census in empl. rate hours
Mean of the dependent variable
0.562 0.618 0.056 24.39
Regression discontinuity estimates
Linear -0.045 *** -0.041 *** -0.029 ** -1.45 **
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.54)
Quadratic -0.048 *** -0.051 *** -0.031 ** -1.75 **
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.61)
Cubic -0.043 ** -0.048 *** -0.030 ** -1.47 *
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.70)
Linear spline -0.047 *** -0.049 *** -0.032 ** -1.72 ***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.55)
Quadratic spline -0.038 -0.056 ** -0.035 * -1.66
(0.024) (0.018) (0.016) (0.94)
Goodness of fit statistic (p-value)
Linear 0.48 0.52 0.91 0.48
Linear spline 0.47 0.72 0.85 0.00
Three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% level; two asterisks for the 5% level,
and one asterisk for the 10% level.    42 
Table 2 
Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Labour Supply 




Quebec Rest of Canada Quebec Rest of Canada Diff-in-Diff
Specification for age 1986 1986 1991 1991
Regression discontinuity estimates: Employment rate on Census week
Linear -0.041 *** -0.013 ** 0.041 * 0.005 -0.064 ***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.022) (0.011) (0.028)
Quadratic -0.051 *** -0.013 * 0.012 -0.017 *** -0.067 ***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.023) (0.006) (0.028)
Cubic -0.048 *** -0.009 0.037 ** -0.016 ** -0.092 ***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.023)
Linear spline -0.049 *** -0.014 * 0.010 -0.010 -0.055 **
(0.011) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.022)
Quadratic spline -0.056 ** -0.007 0.042 * -0.007 -0.098 ***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.022) (0.007) (0.031)
Regression discontinuity estimates: Difference in Employment rate
Linear -0.029 ** -0.009 0.022 * -0.007 -0.049 **
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.018)
Quadratic -0.031 ** -0.006 0.022 -0.005 -0.052 **
(0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.020)
Cubic -0.030 ** -0.004 0.020 -0.002 -0.048 **
(0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.021)
Linear spline -0.032 ** -0.004 0.021 -0.003 -0.052 **
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.022)
Quadratic spline -0.035 * 0.001 0.012 -0.005 -0.053 **
(0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.026)
Three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% level; two asterisks for the 5% level,
and one asterisk for the 10% level.
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Table 3 
Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Higher 
Social Assistance Benefits on other Outcomes in Quebec, 1986 
 
 
Transfers Fraction with Transfers cond. UI Earnings Married
Specification for age ($1000) tranfers>0 on transfers>0 ($1000) ($1000)
Mean of the dependent variable
1.065 0.212 4.885 1.126 13.924 0.323
Regression discontinuity estimates
Linear 0.477 *** 0.041 *** 1.248 *** -0.106 -0.921 -0.027
(0.086) (0.012) (0.232) (0.065) (0.595) (0.021)
Quadratic 0.477 *** 0.041 *** 1.135 *** -0.120 -1.059 * -0.064 ***
(0.089) (0.012) (0.233) (0.072) (0.575) (0.013)
Cubic 0.496 *** 0.042 ** 1.273 *** -0.085 -0.461 -0.050 ***
(0.137) (0.018) (0.320) (0.098) (0.792) (0.012)
Linear spline 0.481 *** 0.041 *** 1.165 *** -0.121 -0.975 -0.055 ***
(0.088) (0.012) (0.218) (0.068) (0.587) (0.012)
Quadratic spline 0.445 ** 0.033 1.169 ** -0.074 0.202 -0.036 *
(0.166) (0.022) (0.423) (0.130) (0.913) (0.016)
Three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% level; two asterisks for the 5% level,
and one asterisk for the 10% level.
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Table 4 
Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Higher 
Benefits on Social Assistance Payments (dollar amount) 
 
 
Quebec Rest of Canada Quebec Rest of Canada
Specification for age 1986 1986 1991 1991
Mean of the dependent variable
1.065 0.646 0.851 0.625
Regression discontinuity estimates
Linear 0.477 *** 0.071 0.153 * -0.074 *
(0.086) (0.049) (0.082) (0.039)
Quadratic 0.477 *** 0.062 0.192 ** -0.067
(0.089) (0.049) 0.083 (0.041)
Cubic 0.496 *** 0.047 0.071 -0.112 *
(0.137) (0.073) (0.103) (0.055)
Linear spline 0.481 *** 0.066 0.180 ** -0.071
(0.088) (0.049) (0.079) (0.041)
Quadratic spline 0.445 ** 0.010 0.034 -0.154 **
(0.166) (0.094) (0.144) (0.067)
Three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% level; two asterisks for the 5% level,
and one asterisk for the 10% level.    45 
Table 5:   Cell Means and Regression Results from the Census 
 
Emp- Positive
sample / specifcation obs. loyed obs. Transfers
Mean of 
dependent Quebec, age 29, 1986 1859 0.661 1859 0.190
variable
Cell means Discontinuity 3506 -0.052 *** 3178 0.058 ***
estimator Quebec, 1986:  Age 30 vs. Age 29 (0.016) (0.015)
Diff-diff 11924 -0.044 ** 10925 0.039 **
1986:  29-30 vs Que-RoC (0.019) (0.016)
Diff-diff 6819 -0.079 *** 6360 0.040 **
Quebec:  29-30 vs 1986-1991 (0.023) (0.020)
Diff-diff 12908 0.010 12908 -0.019
Age 29:  1986-1991 vs Que-RoC (0.018) (0.015)
Diff-diff-diff 24960 -0.079 *** 23005 0.045 **
(0.026) (0.023)
Regression
estimator Diff-diff-diff 24960 -0.074 *** 23005 0.034
(0.026) (0.023)
Three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% level; two asterisks for the 5% level,
and one asterisk for the 10% level.
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Table 6 






Mean of dependent variable
Quebec, Age 25-29, Before 3875 0.616 0.424
Cell Mean Difference Estimators
Diff-diff 18748 -0.056 *** -0.028 **
Quebec:  Before vs. After and 25-29 vs. 30-34 (0.015) (0.014)
Diff-diff 38061 -0.078 *** -0.095 ***
Before:  Quebec vs. RoC and 25-29 vs. 30-34 (0.013) (0.013)
Diff-diff-diff 93996 -0.050 *** -0.062 ***
(0.016) (0.016)
Three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% level; two asterisks for the 5% level,
and one asterisk for the 10% level.  All results are weighted.  
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- - - : Actual regression fit
___ : "Predicted" fit 
 
 








































- - - : Predicted fit from
         models in levels
___ : Actual regression
         fit on change in ER
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